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BRIGNONI-PONCE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
RACE-BASED IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
Isabel M. Skilton
Abstract: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce solidified the racist enforcement of
United States immigration laws by allowing “Mexican appearance” to be a factor
forming reasonable suspicion in a roving patrol. The United States Supreme Court
rationalized race-based immigration enforcement by relying on erroneous
immigration demographics and a misconstrued notion of serving the public interest.
This comment demonstrates that the rationales provided by the Supreme Court are
illogical, discriminatory, and harmful to communities of color. This comment
analyzes the impacts of race-based discrimination and provides alternatives which
may cabin the impact of Brignoni-Ponce. Aside from overruling Brignoni-Ponce
in its entirety, a probable cause or warrant requirement could be added, either
through legislative or judicial action, so as to bolster the Fourth Amendment rights
of citizens and noncitizens alike.
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INTRODUCTION
Immigration law is selectively enforced and adjudicated on the basis of
race—focusing on who is perceived to be a danger to the community based
on the color of their skin and their country of origin. In the United States,
Latin Americans,1 particularly those of Mexican decent,2 have frequently been
targeted and profiled by immigration enforcement. In 1975, the United States
Supreme Court legitimized race-based immigration enforcement in United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce. The Court held that “Mexican appearance” could
be a factor, though not the sole factor, to consider when determining whether
it was appropriate to stop and search a vehicle within the 100-mile United
States border.3 Through Brignoni-Ponce, the Supreme Court labeled those
who did not fit the white mold as “foreign,” condoned disparate policing
standards, and ultimately weakened the Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable search and seizure for all individuals of “Mexican
appearance.”4 When Brignoni-Ponce was decided, only four percent of the
United States population was Latin American.5 Today, the demographics of
the United States have dramatically diversified. White Americans make up
sixty-two percent of those living in the United States6 and Latin Americans
1

The courts and United States governmental bodies frequently use the term Hispanic or Latino to
describe individuals from Mexico and Central and South America. These terms fail to accurately describe
such populations. The term “Hispanic” describes individuals who speak Spanish, including those who live in
Spain. It also fails to capture individuals in Latin America who do not speak Spanish, such as those who
speak Portuguese, French, and Indigenous languages, such as Quechua, Guarani, and Aymara. The term
“Latino,” on the other hand, like much of the Spanish vocabulary, is a gendered word in the masculine form
and therefore excludes women and nonbinary individuals. “Latinx” has been used as a gender-neutral term.
See ED MORALES, LATINX: THE NEW FORCE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND CULTURE (2018). For this comment,
I will use the term “Latin American” to describe individuals from Latin America. Latin America includes
American countries south of the United States. See Latin America, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Latin-American (last visited May 2, 2022).
2
For the purposes of this comment, those of Mexican descent include those who were born in Mexico
or those whose parents or grandparents were born in Mexico. Note that while “Mexican” is a nationality, it
has been racialized in the United States and many stereotypes have been established and perpetrated as a
result.
3
Modern Immigration Wave Brings 59 Million to U.S., Driving Population Growth and Change
Through 2065, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2015/09/28/
modern-immigration-wave-brings-59-million-to-u-s-driving-population-growth-and-change-through-2065/.
4
See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886–87 (1975).
5
PEW RSCH. CTR., supra note 3. In its ruling, the Supreme Court accepted incorrect data provided by
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). The INS had estimated, without empirical data, that 6.8
to 10.2 million undocumented Mexicans were present in the United States at the time. However,
demographers later agreed that this number was closer to 1.7 to 2.3 million. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 879,
n.5; Jorge Durand et al., The Demographic Foundations of the Latino Population, in HISPANIC AND THE
FUTURE OF AMERICA (Marta Tienda & Faith Mitchell eds., 2006).
6
PEW RSCH. CTR., supra note 3.
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make up eighteen percent of the United States population—both authorized
and unauthorized.7 Any rationale for immigration enforcement that boils
down to an ethnic or race-based appearance is unrealistic, unworkable, and
illogical. Most importantly, it is discriminatory and harmful to those who are
forced to bear the weight of heightened surveillance and policing.
Brignoni-Ponce remains a stronghold of the racist United States
immigration system, arming immigration enforcement and the courts with a
rationale and legal basis to continue perpetuating disparate and
unconstitutional treatment of immigrant communities. The legitimation of
disparate enforcement is evident in deportation rates for Black immigrants and
immigrants of color in the United States. Today seventy-six percent of Black
immigrants are deported on criminal grounds, compared to the average of
forty-five percent of immigrants as a whole.8 For a searingly horrific example
one need look no further than the 2021 wholesale deportation of Haitian
refugees by immigration enforcement on horseback—echoing scenes from
our nation’s gruesome and shameful history of extrajudicial lynching and
murder of Black communities.9
This comment analyzes the impacts of race-based discrimination and provides
alternatives which may cabin the impact of Brignoni-Ponce. Section I briefly
explores the history of Latin Americans, particularly Mexicans, within the
United States and how these populations have been impacted by United States
immigration policies and race-based immigration enforcement mechanisms.
Section II assesses how the holdings in Terry v. Ohio and Brignoni-Ponce
permit immigrant enforcement to stop individuals on the basis of race and how
those rulings have been interpreted by lower courts. Finally, Section III
analyzes the flaws of Brignoni-Ponce and explores alternatives to alleviate the
harm the Supreme Court has condoned. Ultimately, this comment proposes
heightened standards to authorize the stop and visual search of a car though a
roving patrol through the requirement of probable cause instead of reasonable
suspicion.

7

Luis Noe-Bustamante et al., U.S. Hispanic population surpassed 60 million in 2019, but growth has
slowed, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 7, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/07/07/u-s-hispanicpopulation-surpassed-60-million-in-2019-but-growth-has-slowed/.
8
Renée Feltz, Black Immigrants Much More Likely to Be Deported Over Criminal Offenses, Data
Shows, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 3, 2016, 10:06 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/oct/03/blackimmigrants-us-deportation-rates-criminal-convictions.
9
Migrants in Texas: US Probes Horseback Charge on Haiti Migrants, BBC NEWS (Sept. 21, 2021),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-58637116.
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CIRCULAR MISTREATMENT: RACE-BASED IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT

In Brignoni-Ponce, the United States Supreme Court held that a trained
law enforcement officer deciding whether to conduct an investigatory
immigration stop may, “in light of his experience,” rely upon a person’s racial
appearance.10 The Court largely justified its ruling on the demographics of the
United States in the 1970s, particularly the size of Mexican communities.
Underlying the decision was the prevailing belief that most unlawful residents
of the United States were Mexican. But the increase of unauthorized
Mexicans in the United States at the time was not due to rising immigration
numbers—it was a consequence of policies that dramatically reduced the
number of authorized immigrants. Such policies arbitrarily criminalized
Mexican immigrants. Coupled with these immigration policies, BrignoniPonce legitimized raced-based practices that harm immigrant communities
and any community perceived by law enforcement as foreign. To better
understand the rise of these race-based practices, it is important to understand
a key policy underlying them—the Hart-Celler Act, passed in 1965.
A.

The Hart-Celler Act Criminalized Mexican Immigrants

The perception that a majority of Mexicans in the United States were
unauthorized residents stems in part from the passage of the Hart-Celler Act
in 1965, which severely limited the number of immigrants authorized to enter
the United States every year.
In the midst of the Civil Rights Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, the
Hart-Celler Act amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to
eliminate the national origins quota system and allow each nation to send up
to 20,000 people to the United States every year.11 While the Hart-Celler Act
was passed with the goal of reducing the racist foundations that define United
States immigration enforcement, it crippled pre-existing migration patterns
into the United States.
The Hart-Celler Act had particularly devastating consequences for
Mexican laborers in the United States. Following the Hart-Celler Act, the
10

Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885–87.
See CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, MIGRATING TO PRISON, AMERICA’S OBSESSION
WITH LOCKING UP IMMIGRANTS 45 (2019); Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to
Immigration Law: A New Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273 (1996);
César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Unseen Exclusions in Voting and Immigration Law, 17 BERKELEY J.
AFR. AM. L. & POL’Y 168 (2015).
11
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demand for Mexican labor did not diminish and the migration patterns of
Mexican nationals did not change.12 This can be seen through the Hart-Celler
Act not accounting for the former Bracero Program, which allowed temporary
workers to legally work in the United States.13 Congress’ failure to “bring
these temporary workers into the legal permanent migration stream” resulted
in the “transformation, beginning in 1965, of the Mexican worker from legal
and temporary to permanent and undocumented.”14 The Hart-Celler Act made
the continuation of these migration patterns unlawful.15 The Act severely
limits authorized entry into the United States and is credited in large part with
the increase in unauthorized Mexican immigration.16 Prior to 1965, 200,000
Mexican immigrants had been legally entering the United States on a yearly
basis.17 In 1968, the year the Act went into effect, 151,000 Mexicans were
deported.18 When the law was further amended in 1976 to reduce Mexican
quotas to 20,000 per year, 781,000 Mexicans were deported.19 By the end of
the 1970s immigration enforcement was apprehending nearly one million
unauthorized immigrants along the United States-Mexico border.20
The unauthorized or undocumented21 Mexican immigrant has taken on
the stereotype of a criminal.22 This stereotype is not only factually incorrect,
but it also stems from policies—such as the Hart-Celler Act—that arbitrarily
criminalized patterns of migration that communities had relied on for years.23
The abrupt restrictions on migration created by the Hart-Cellar Act failed to
accommodate pre-existing migration patterns. Mexican migrants continued to
travel to supply the United States demand for labor and were criminalized for
doing so.
12

GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 11, at 44–45
Leticia M. Saucedo, The Impact of 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act on the Evolution of
Temporary Guest Worker Programs, or How the 1965 Act Punted on Creating a Rightful Place for Mexican
Worker Migration, in THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT OF 1965, 292, 292 (Gabriel J. Chin & Rose
Cuison Villazor, eds., 2015).
14
Id.
15
GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 11, at 45.
16
Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, Mexicans decline to less than half the U.S. unauthorized
immigrant population for the first time, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 12, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2019/06/12/us-unauthorized-immigrant-population-2017/.
17
GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 11, at 45.
18
TIMOTHY J. HENDERSON, BEYOND BORDERS: A HISTORY OF MEXICAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED
STATES 99 (2011).
19
Id.
20
Id. at 102.
21
The word “unauthorized” is used here to describe individuals who have entered or remained in the
United States in a manner that is prohibited by United States immigration laws.
22
‘Drug dealers, criminals, rapists’: What Trump thinks of Mexicans, BBC NEWS (Aug. 31, 2016)
https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-37230916.
23
FRANCISCO E. BALDERRAMA & RAYMOND RODRIGUEZ, DECADE OF BETRAYAL: MEXICAN
REPATRIATION IN THE 1930S, 8 (Univ. of New Mexico Press, rev. ed. 2006).
13
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Profiling Latin Americans Harms Communities of Color

As the Hart-Celler Act contributed to the increase in unauthorized
immigrants in the United States, the federal government also amplified racebased policing of communities of color through the expansion of immigration
enforcement.
Immigration enforcement grew through increased presence at the
border and through cooperation with local law enforcement. After the passage
of the Hart-Celler Act, the federal government “allocated more money and
employed more Border Patrol agents,” who in turn spent more time attempting
to apprehend individuals who were entering the United States without
authorization.24 The United States Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) conducts
three kinds of inland traffic-checking operations: (1) permanent checkpoints;
(2) temporary checkpoints; and (3) roving patrols.25 In permanent and
temporary checkpoints, the vehicle must stop and CBP officers may question
the occupants regarding their citizenship and immigration status. In a roving
patrol, an officer may pull over a vehicle based on reasonable suspicion that
someone in the vehicle is an unauthorized immigrant.26 Here, the officer may
ask questions and conduct a visual search of the car.
Immigration enforcement is also pursued through cooperation with
local law enforcement through 287(g) agreements, which are named for
Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.27 Under 287(g)
agreements, state and local police are deputized to act as federal immigration
officers.28 In early 2018, seventy-eight agencies in twenty-seven states had
formal agreements with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)29 in
effect.30 A study of the 287(g) program in Nashville, Tennessee, demonstrated
that after the implementation of 287(g), officers were more likely to use
explicit statements that mentioned countries of origin, language ability, and
24

GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 11, at 65.
Kristin Connor, Updating Brignoni-Ponce: A Critical Analysis of Race-Based Immigration
Enforcement, 11 N.Y.U J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 567, 688–89 (citing United States. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 552 (1976)).
26
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886–87.
27
The 287(g) program is named for Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357(g). It became law as a part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996. Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546.
28
GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 11, at 68
29
While CBP is responsible for enforcing immigration laws at and near the borders, ICE is responsible
for enforcing immigration laws within the remaining areas of the United States. See Border Patrol Overview,
U.S.
CUSTOMS
AND
BORDER
PROTECTIONS,
https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-usborders/overview (last visited May 2, 2022); Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/about-ice/homeland-security-investigations (last visited May 2, 2022).
30
GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 11, at 67.
25
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legal status.31 These statements suggest that the implementation of local
immigration enforcement “brings characteristics of foreignness to the
forefront of policing duties, resulting in an unintended shift in policing
behaviors.”32 Other studies similarly show that Latin Americans, and anyone
associated with “Latinidad by accent or perception of foreignness in spite of
whiteness are treated as a deportable population.”33 Policing on the basis of
race is pervasive even outside the context of immigration enforcement.
Studies show that racial minorities experience disproportionately higher rate
of stops by law enforcement for minor infractions.34 One study showed that
Black and Hispanic drivers were stopped fifty percent more often than white
drivers.35 Such enforcement practices harm communities who experience
heightened policing. The tactics used by law enforcement often produce
“distress, vulnerability, and anxiety in the lives of young immigrants and their
families, often resulting in legitimate fears of detention and deportation since
enforcement measures disproportionately affect Latin Americans and other
racialized immigration groups” in the United States.36
Increased policing by immigration officials and enforcement tactics
like 287(g) agreements amplify the extent to which race-based rationales may
be utilized as justification for stops and searches for individuals who appear
“foreign” in the eyes of immigration enforcement. Not only do race-based
policies harm Latin American communities, they are also ineffective.
Increased border enforcement following the Hart-Celler Act did not impact
the likelihood that migrants would cross the border.37 The journey north
became more difficult and more expensive, but the outcome did not change.38
Combined, the Hart-Celler Act, increased immigration enforcement at
the southern border, and 287(g) agreements expanded the methods by which
law enforcement could conduct discriminatory race-based policing. The
Supreme Court provided these officials with the legal basis to execute race31

See generally Katharine M. Donato & Leslie Ann Rodriguez, Police Arrests in a Time of
Uncertainty: The Impact of 287(g) on Arrests in a New Immigrant Gateway, 58(13) AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST
1696 (2014).
32
Id. at 1717–18.
33
Elizabeth Aranda & Elizabeth Vaquera, Racism, the Immigration Enforcement Regime, and the
Implications for Racial Inequality in the Lives of Undocumented Young Adults, 1 SOCIO. RACE & EQUAL. 88,
98 (2015).
34
See Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and TrafficSstops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425 (1996); David A.
Harris, “Driving while Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic
Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544 (1997).
35
See Katherine Y. Barnes, Assessing the Counterfactual: The Efficacy of Drug Interdiction Absences
Racial Profiling, 54 DUKE L.G. 1089 (2005).
36
Aranda & Vaquera, supra note 31, at 88.
37
GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 11, at 65–66.
38
Id. at 66.
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based immigration enforcement within the context of roving patrols. Hand-inhand, these mechanisms continue to erode the constitutional rights of all,
inflicting the most harm on communities of color.
II.

ESTABLISHING THE RACE-BASED LEGAL STANDARD TO
SEARCH A VEHICLE OR PERSON
A.

Taking a Hatchet to the Fourth Amendment

The Supreme Court lowered the protections provided by the Fourth
Amendment through the establishment of the reasonable suspicion standard
in Terry v. Ohio.39 Reasonable suspicion requires less than probable cause,
thereby prioritizing law enforcement’s ability to search and seize over an
individual’s constitutional right to be free from surveillance and policing. In
Brignoni-Ponce, the Supreme Court subsequently allowed race and ethnicity
to be a factor in determining whether reasonable suspicion was established in
the context of a roving patrol conducted by CBP. These two cases set up the
legal basis for race-based immigration enforcement, which has been only
marginally cabined by lower courts and remains a pillar of the racist U.S.
immigration system.
1.

Terry v. Ohio lowered the standard required to conduct a
constitutional search

Before condoning race and ethnic appearance as a factor for suspecting
an individual as undocumented, the Supreme Court lowered the standard for
a search to “reasonable suspicion” with its ruling in Terry v. Ohio.40 In this
case, a police officer perceived two men outside a store to be contemplating a
robbery of the store.41 At trial, the police officer testified to his belief that the
men may have been armed at the time.42 The officer approached the men,
identified himself, and questioned them.43 Receiving mumbled answers, the
police officer patted down the outer clothing of one of the men and discovered

39
40
41
42
43

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
Id. at 30–31 (1968).
Id. at 1–9.
Id.
Id.
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a gun in the coat pocket.44 The Supreme Court upheld the search as
constitutional.
This decision reduced the constitutional protection against searches and
seizures. The Fourth Amendment mandates that people be “secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures.”45 It further requires that no warrants be issued without “probable
cause,46 supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”47 In Terry v. Ohio, the
Supreme Court lowered the legal standard required to conduct a constitutional
search and thereby sacrificed protections offered by the Fourth Amendment.
The Court held that weapons found by a police officer while conducting an
inventory search without probable cause were admissible.48 The police officer
in Terry was only required to point to “specific and articulable facts which
taken together” reasonably warranted a belief that his safety or that of others
was in danger.49 As such, the Court prioritized the perceived safety of the
officer over the Fourth Amendment right of individuals subject to being
stopped and searched.
2.

Brignoni-Ponce opened the door to explicit race-based
immigration enforcement

In 1975, the United States Supreme Court, in United States v. BrignoniPonce, accepted “Mexican appearance” as a basis for reasonable suspicion
that an individual is an unauthorized immigrant.50 In this case a roving patrol
stopped a vehicle near the U.S.-Mexico border.51 The two immigration
officers questioned its occupants about their immigration status and
citizenship.52 The opinion states that the only reason the officers stopped the
vehicle and questioned the occupants was because of their “apparent Mexican
ancestry.”53 The Supreme Court held that this was a violation of their Fourth

44

Id.
U.S. CONT. AMEND. IV.
46
Probable cause to conduct a search exists when “the facts available to [the police officer] would
warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that contraband or evidence of crime is present.” Florida
v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 243 (2013) (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (quotations omitted)).
47
U.S. CONT. AMEND. IV.
48
Terry, 392 U.S. at 30–31.
49
Id. at 24.
50
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886–87.
51
Id. at 875–77
52
Id.
53
Id. at 874–75, 877.
45
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Amendment rights because the only rationale used here was appearance.54
However, the Supreme Court held that in a roving patrol a CBP officer may
consider “Mexican” appearance as a basis, though not sole basis, for
reasonable suspicion justifying the stop of a vehicle.55
The Court cited to data from the INS indicating that between ten to
twelve million unauthorized immigrants were “illegally in the country” in
1972 and that a vast majority of “deportable [immigrants] arrested each year”
were Mexican.56 The Court provided the following factors to consider in the
analysis of reasonable suspicion: (1) characteristics of the area, (2) proximity
to the border, (3) usual patterns of traffic, (4) previous experience with
“unauthorized immigration” traffic, (5) information about recent illegal
border crossings in the area, (6) the driver’s behavior, (7) aspects of the
vehicle, and (8) characteristic appearance of persons who live in Mexico,
relying on factors such as mode of dress and haircut.57
By requiring reasonable suspicion, the Court constrained the unfettered
power provided to CBP officers by statute and regulation58 to search for
“[unauthorized immigrants] in any vehicle” within 100 miles of the border.59
The Court further held that race could not be the only rationale for reasonable
suspicion.60 There were enough United States citizens who shared
appearances associated with Mexicans or who themselves identified with
Mexican heritage to bar officers from stopping individuals solely on their
appearance. 61 The Court further supported this statement by citing the small
percentage of persons of Mexican origin registered as “unauthorized
immigrants” even in states with large Mexican populations.62
The Court also, however, held that “the likelihood that any given person
of Mexican ancestry is an [unauthorized immigrant] is high enough to make
Mexican appearance a relevant factor.”63 The Court failed to qualify the

54

Id. at 886.
Id. at 886–87.
56
Id. at 879, n.5 (“In 1970, for example, 80% of the deportable immigrants arrested were from
Mexico… In 1974 the figure was 92%”).
57
Id. at 884–85.
58
8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a) (1975), 8 U.S.C. 1357(a)(1), and 8 U.S.C. 1357(a)(3).
59
8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a).
60
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886–87.
61
Id.
62
Id. The Court cited the following: 12.4% of persons of Mexican origin in Texas were registered
unauthorized immigrants from Mexico; 8.5% of persons of Mexican origin in New Mexico were registered
unauthorized immigrants from Mexico; 14.2% of persons of Mexican origin in Arizona were registered
unauthorized immigrants from Mexico; 20.4% of persons of Mexican origin in California were registered
unauthorized immigrants from Mexico. Id. at n.12.
63
Id. at 886–87.
55
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likelihood justifying the use of race as a factor for reasonable suspicion.64
Ultimately, by allowing race or ethnicity as a basis for reasonable suspicion,
the Court paved the way for criminalization based on appearance.65 When
reviewing an officer’s reasonable suspicion, the Supreme Court held that
adjudicators look at the “totality of the circumstances.”66 Explaining that “this
process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized
training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative
information available to them that might well elude an untrained person.”67 In
this way, it is clear that the Court believed that officers had training and tools
from their experience to make fair and just decisions in their enforcement of
the law and that their biases were not racist perceptions, but instead a
reflection of the reality at the border.
Even if officers were prohibited from using race as a factor, they have
the freedom to use other rationales to construe reasonable articulable
suspicion as a pretext for a racially or ethnically motivated stop.68 The
Supreme Court held in Whren v. United States that an officer’s subjective
motivation is not relevant to the inquiry of reasonable suspicion.69
Consequently, the Fourth Amendment’s preclusion of unreasonable searches
and seizures or requirement of probable cause is not an avenue to consider
disproportionate and discriminatory application of the law.70 Instead, the
Court concluded that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is the only avenue of relief.71 To demonstrate that law
enforcement operations are discriminatory, a court must find discriminatory
intent.72 Thus, racially disparate results of an otherwise race-neutral policy do
not violate the Equal Protection Clause.73 Even if the legitimization of racebased law enforcement in Brignoni-Ponce is denounced or overruled, the
issue of profiling and over-surveillance of communities of color, including
immigrant communities, is far from resolved.

64

See id.
Immigration infractions have continually been used as rationales to pursue criminal charges. See
generally César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Creating Crimmigration, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1457, 1468
(2014).
66
United States v. Arvisu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2000)
67
Id.
68
See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1977)
73
Personnel Adm’r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 42 U.S. 256, 272 (1979).
65
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Judicial Application of Brignoni-Ponce in the Fifth, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits

Brignoni-Ponce has been applied largely in cases in the southern
regions of the Ninth Circuit74 and the Fifth75 and Tenth Circuits,76 because of
the large Latin American populations in those regions and the stationing of
border patrol agents along the United States-Mexico border.77 The Ninth
Circuit has expressly limited officials’ discretion to use race or ethnicity as a
factor for reasonable suspicion where Latin American appearance does not
have probative worth. The Fifth and Tenth Circuits have failed to expressly
denounce the race-based immigration enforcement allowed by BrignoniPonce but have indicated that in areas with significant Latin American
populations, reasonable suspicion cannot be based on “Mexican
appearance.”78
1.

The Ninth Circuit Has Cabined Brignoni-Ponce

The Ninth Circuit explicitly cabined Brignoni-Ponce through its ruling
in United States v. Montero-Camargo, in which it held that “Mexican”
appearance is not a proper factor to consider in determining whether Border
Patrol agents had reasonable suspicion to stop individuals in locations where
a large portion of the legal resident population is Latin American.79
In Montero-Camargo, two immigration enforcement officers in
separate cars observed two drivers travelling together in an area “used to drop
off and pick up undocumented aliens and illegal drugs, while evading
inspection.”80 The agents followed the cars, pulled them over, searched the
cars finding marijuana in one and a pistol and ammunition in the other, and
arrested the drivers.81 Charged violation of federal statutes regulating
possession and distribution of marijuana and the possession of a firearm and
ammunition, the three defendants filed a pretrial motion to suppress on the
ground that the vehicle stop was not based on reasonable suspicion.82 The
74
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district court however denied the motion stating that there was “sufficient
founded suspicion to make an investigatory stop” because of four factors
including “the fact that the occupants of both cars appeared to be of Hispanic
descent.”83 The defendants appealed arguing that the district court erroneously
denied their motion to suppress.84
The Ninth Circuit held that factors such as Latin American ancestry or
appearance “have such a low probative value that no reasonable officer would
have relied on them to make an investigative stop and must therefore be
disregarded as a matter of law.”85 As the Supreme Court did in BrignoniPonce, the Ninth Circuit based its rationale on the number of Latin Americans
in the area where the stop and seizure occurred.86 The court explained that
“reasonable suspicion requires particularized suspicion, and in an area in
which a large number of people share a specific characteristic, that
characteristic casts too wide a net to play any part in a particularized
reasonable suspicion determination.”87
However, the key holding from Brignoni-Ponce is still governing case
law in the Ninth Circuit, even in areas where there are few Latin Americans.
For example, the Ninth Circuit declined to extend its holding in MonteroCamargo to United States v. Manzo-Jurado, which addressed a stop that took
place in Havre, Montana, where Latin Americans comprised 1.5 percent of
the population.88
In areas with large Latin American populations, like Maricopa County,
Arizona, the Ninth Circuit has continued to prohibit CBP officials and local
law enforcement from forming reasonable suspicion based on race or
ethnicity.89 In 2000, almost twenty-five percent of Maricopa County residents
self-identified as being of “Hispanic” or “Latino” origin.90 In Melendres v.
Arpaio, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) had instructed the
Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO), which had been enforcing
immigration laws through a 287(g) agreement, that apparent Mexican
ancestry could be used in forming a reasonable suspicion that a person is
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unlawfully in the United States.91 The district court, however, held that ICE
agents’ training and the MCSO’s subsequent enforcement tactics ignored the
Ninth Circuit’s prior holding that in locations where a “significant portion of
the legal resident population is of Hispanic ancestry, Hispanic decent is not a
permissible factor to consider, either alone or in conjunction with other
factors, in forming reasonable suspicion.”92 The district court in Arizona
further found that the MCSO’s express racial classifications in the policies,
practices, and procedures “established that the MCSO had sufficient intent to
discriminate against Latino occupants of a motor vehicle.”93 The court also
found the policy of considering Latin American appearance “probative of
whether a person is legally present in the country” to be facially
discriminatory and in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.94
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit disallowed Latin American appearance to
be used as a factor in areas with large Latin American populations. However,
the Ninth Circuit simultaneously did not address the probative worth of other
races as a factor for reasonable suspicion in a roving patrol, and expressly
allowed the use of racial and/or ethnic appearance in geographic areas where
individuals of a specific race or ethnicity were not prevalent enough to remove
“probative value.”95
2.

The Fifth and Tenth Circuits

The Fifth Circuit has declined to establish reasonable suspicion for
stops based on “Mexican appearance” in areas with significant Latin
American populations, however, it has not explicitly cabined BrignoniPonce.96 In United States v. Orona-Sanchez, the court held there is nothing
“vaguely suspicious about the presence of persons who appear to be of Latin
origin in New Mexico where over one-third of the population is Hispanic.”97
The court also, however, reiterated the same factors to be considered in
91
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establishing reasonable suspicion as those listed by the Supreme Court in
Brignoni Ponce, including “number and appearance of the passengers” and
giving credence to the “experience of the agents.”98
The Tenth Circuit has also continued to rely on Brignoni-Ponce to
determine whether a stop was supported by reasonable suspicion.99 However,
the Tenth Circuit has rephrased the eight relevant factors from BrignoniPonce for assessing reasonable suspicion in order to exclude “Mexican
appearance” as a factor. 100 Instead, in United States v. Monsisvais, the Tenth
Circuit listed the Brignoni-Ponce factors as follows:
(1) characteristics of the area in which the vehicle is encountered;
(2) the proximity of the area to the border; (3) the usual patterns
of traffic on the particular road; (4) the previous experience of
the agent with alien traffic; (5) information about recent illegal
border crossings in the area; (6) the driver's behavior, including
any obvious attempts to evade officers; (7) aspects of the vehicle,
such as a station wagon with concealed compartments; and (8)
the appearance that the vehicle is heavily loaded.101
As such, the Tenth Circuit seems to have silently erased the racial appearance
of the driver or passengers as a factor to be considered in the analysis of
reasonable suspicion without directly confronting or contradicting BrignoniPonce.102
Neither the Fifth nor the Tenth Circuit have expressly cabined
Brignoni-Ponce like the Ninth Circuit. Instead, it appears both circuits have
simply declined to use ethnicity as a factor rationalizing a stop in a roving
patrol without addressing head-on the disparate legal standard established by
Brignoni-Ponce.
III.

LOOKING FORWARD: BRIGNONI-PONCE MUST GO

As seen through U.S. case law and immigration enforcement
mechanisms, Brignoni-Ponce allows for heightened discrimination that
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
98
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Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Additionally, Brignoni-Ponce
violates international laws such as the International Convention of the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the International Convention of
Civil and Political Rights. Brignoni-Ponce should be overruled due its overt
allowance of disparate treatment and discrimination based on perceived race
or ethnicity and its violation of international treaties signed and ratified by the
United States. However, given the high standard of proof required for Equal
Protection claims and the lack of any enforcement mechanism in the
international realm, Brignoni-Ponce could alternatively be cabined by
repealing legislation that authorizes immigration enforcement to circumvent
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment at the border. The discrimination
established in Brignoni-Ponce could also be avoided by requiring a warrant
establishing probable cause before executing roving patrols in certain
geographic areas.
A.

Rationales for Using Race or Ethnicity as a Basis for Reasonable
Suspicion Are Not Applicable

In Brignoni-Ponce, the Supreme Court rationalized the use of “Mexican
appearance” as a basis for reasonable suspicion because (1) evidence
indicated that there were large numbers of Mexicans living in the United
States without authorization, (2) immigrants, particularly unauthorized
immigrants, strain social services and the economy, (3) the public interest
requires enforcement of the nation’s immigration laws, and (4) the
interference with the immigrant’s individual liberty through race-based roving
patrols is modest. These rationales from the Supreme Court are not applicable
and are discriminatory.
1.

It is illogical to base reasonable suspicion of unauthorized
presence in the United States on racial or ethnic
appearance.

It is illogical to base suspicion of unauthorized presence on racial or
ethnic appearance. In the context of “Mexican appearance,” there is no
singular appearance that equates to an individual’s Mexican nationality.
Furthermore, courts have tended to discuss Latin Americans as a monolithic
group without accounting for the racial and ethnic diversity of a geographic

308

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 31 NO. 2

area consisting of thirty-three countries.103 Due to the diverse ethnic heritage
of this vast region, Latin Americans may visually present as indigenous,
white, Black, Asian, and as members of other racial groups. The concept of
Mexican appearance or “Latinidad” is a product of the United States’s
consistent attempt to place every group of people into a racialized box that
distinguishes the “other” from white.104
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Brignoni-Ponce also lacks logic
because the demographic data it relied upon was inaccurate.105 The Court
stated that of the ten to twelve million unauthorized immigrants, the
government estimated that eighty-five percent were Mexican.106 This would
mean that there were anywhere between 8.5 to 10.2 million unauthorized
Mexicans in the United States. However, in 1980—just five years after
Brignoni-Ponce was decided—demographers reached consensus that the
unauthorized Mexican population was instead between 1.7 and 2.3 million.107
Today, Mexicans do not constitute the majority of unauthorized
immigrants in the United States. Instead, unauthorized immigration has
recently increased from Asia and Central America.108 In 2007, 1,300,000
unauthorized immigrants from Asia entered in the United States.109 Ten years
later, that number grew by 130,000.110 In the same time period, the number of
unauthorized Mexicans entering the United States decreased by 2,000,000.111
Furthermore, it is predicted that by 2065 Asians will be the largest immigrant
group in the United States.112 These trends should not be used, however, to
alter which ethnicities and races should be profiled and targeted. Instead, these
numbers demonstrate that even if it were not discriminatory, it is
counterintuitive to base suspicion of unauthorized presence on appearance.
The perception of who is undocumented and who belongs in the United States
is tied not to actual migration data or statistics but instead to rhetoric and
policies that build the concept of foreignness. 113 Race-based policing does
not serve as a rational mechanism in enforcing immigration laws.
103
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Immigrants do not strain social services or the economy

The Supreme Court’s concern with the strain immigrants place on the
social services and the economy of the United States is unfounded.
Unauthorized immigrants, and even legal permanent residents, have long been
excluded from federal public benefits programs such as the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), nonemergency Medicaid,
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF).114 Additionally, studies show that immigrants, including
unauthorized immigrants, are a “net positive for the economy and pay more
into the system than they take out.”115 Legalizing unauthorized immigrants
could added $1.5 trillion to the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) over a
decade, largely due to the increased wages and purchasing power of this
population.116 Additionally, immigrants, even those who are unauthorized,
pay a significant amount in taxes. Studies show that unauthorized immigrants
paid $11.2 billion in state and local taxes in 2010 alone.117
In fact, studies demonstrate that a policy of mass deportation would
immediately reduce the “nation’s GDP by 1.4 percent, and ultimately by 2.6
percent, and reduce cumulative GDP over 10 years by $4.7 trillion.”118 This
is largely due to the reduction in labor and the dramatic impact the U.S.
economy would face with the reduction of seven million workers who
currently do not have authorization to be in the United States.119 Far from
harming the nation’s economy, undocumented immigrants contribute to it
without benefiting from many social programs. Immigration policies,
however, should not be based on how “useful” a person can be or the ways in
which they can provide service to a nation, instead they should be squared on
principles of decency, fairness, and equality. It can be dangerous and
exclusionary to promote immigration only for the “good” immigrants and
relegate those determined as less worthy to the margins.
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The public interest is not served by reducing unauthorized
immigration

The Supreme Court presumed that the public is interested in reducing
unauthorized immigration even if the mechanisms used to do so
disproportionately target Latin American communities. Today, Latin
Americans make up almost one-fifth of the United States population.120 The
depiction of Latin Americans as “foreign” and their exclusion from the
concept of the public interest has always been reprehensible, but it has become
even more inexcusable as the Latin American population in this country has
grown. Furthermore, today, most Americans do not think undocumented
immigrants “take jobs U.S. citizens want or are more likely to commit serious
crimes.”121 This perspective indicates that it is not in the public interest to
demand “measures to prevent the illegal entry of [unauthorized immigrants]
at the Mexican border” at such a high cost to ethnic and racial minorities.122
4.

The interference with individual liberty through racebased roving patrols is severe

Lastly, the Supreme Court inaccurately described the interference with
individual liberty to be modest.123 Racially based enforcement strategies are
harmful to Latin American communities. As described by Justice Reinhardt
in the Montero-Camargo opinion,
[S]tops based on race or ethnic appearance send an underlying
message to all our citizens that those who are not white are
judged by the color of their skin alone. Such stops also send a
clear message that those who are not white enjoy a lesser degree
of Constitutional protection – that they are in effect assumed to
be potential criminals first and individuals second.124
Here, the Ninth Circuit indicated, without deciding, that consideration
of race in Brignoni-Ponce clashes with the Supreme Court’s holding in other
contexts where it has held that race may not considered to remedy past
120
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discrimination.125 Furthermore, in Melendres v. Arpaio, the Ninth Circuit
found the practice of targeting Latin Americans to be facially discriminatory
and therefore a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.126 However, due to
the high standard of proof required in Equal Protection claims, it is unlikely
that courts will consistently find reasonable suspicion in part on the basis of
race to be discriminatory.
B.

Brignoni-Ponce Is Discriminatory and Violates International
Law

United Nations treaties prohibit discrimination on the basis of race. The
International Convention of the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD)
is the broadest expression of the antidiscrimination principle. “Racial
discrimination” under CERD means “any distinction, exclusion, restriction or
preference based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin” which
impairs the recognition “of human rights and fundamental freedom in the
political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.”127 Racial
discrimination, as defined by the CERD treaty, is a violation of internationally
recognized human rights.128 Additionally, nations must prohibit and eliminate
“racial discrimination in all forms,” notably including the “right to equal
treatment before the tribunals and all other organs administering justice.”129
The International Convention of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also
recognizes that the law within a nation “shall prohibit any discrimination and
guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination”
on the basis of race.130
Brignoni-Ponce explicitly allows and advocates for profiling, policing,
and ultimately criminalization of individuals on the basis of their race,
ethnicity, and nation of origin. As such, Brignoni-Ponce and the prevailing
law of reasonable articulable suspicion within the United States violates these
international treaties. Even the Ninth Circuit’s narrower approach is
inconsistent with international law because it allows for race-based
discrimination in areas where few Latin Americans live. International laws do
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not suggest that a right to be free from discrimination varies depending on
how much of a minority you are in the area where you live.
The United States ratified CERD in 1994 and ICCPR in 1992, and as
such is obligated to comply with and implement the provisions of both CERD
and ICCPR. In the event of a violation of either treaty, anyone claiming to be
a victim of a violation can submit a complaint against a party to a treaty.131
The applicant must provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate a violation of
their rights by the United States, or the applicant is considered unfounded.132
Considering that the individuals who are experiencing the discrimination are
usually those who are new to the country and likely lack resources, creating
such a complaint and establishing the evidence required would be extremely
challenging.
Regardless of the challenges an individual may face in demonstrating
racial discrimination at the hands of federal immigration enforcement, even if
they establish a violation of either the CERD or ICCPR, they would still be
required to exhaust all remedies available and effective domestically first.133
In addition, there is no enforcement mechanism available to address the
violation of UN treaties. The United States has not and will likely never be
held accountable for violating these UN treaties. The solution to the
discriminatory outcome derived from Brignoni-Ponce must be found
domestically.
C.

Requiring a Warrant for Roving Patrols Would Increase Fourth
Amendment Protections

An alternative to upholding Brignoni-Ponce or overruling BrignoniPonce entirely is to require a higher standard to authorize the stop and visual
search of a car through a roving patrol. This can be accomplished through the
requirement of a warrant, not simply reasonable suspicion. A warrant requires
probable cause, a higher standard than reasonable articulable suspicion.134
Two ways to require a warrant, and thereby probable cause, for a roving patrol
are (1) through the elimination of the section of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) which allows for warrantless searches, or (2) by
requiring warrants for geographic areas where CBP intends to conduct a
roving patrol.
131
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It is in Congress’ power to pass legislation that revises or eliminates 8
U.S.C. §§ 1357(a)(1) and (3), which allow immigration enforcement to
circumvent the requirements of the Fourth Amendment along the border.135
CBP is permitted to board vehicles and vessels and search for individuals
without immigration status without a warrant at the border.136 The border
zones extend 100 miles into the interior of the United States and include
almost every major city in the United States.137 Seventy-five percent of the
United States population lives within this border zone.138 Without this statute,
CBP or local law enforcement cooperating with CBP would have little basis
to search vehicles where unauthorized immigrants may be present without a
warrant.
Instead of requiring a warrant at the border, CBP could be required to
get a warrant to conduct roving patrols of specific geographic areas, as
recommended by Justice Powell in his concurrence in Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States.139 Here, the Supreme Court held that the search of a Mexican
citizen who held a valid work permit by a CBP roving patrol was not a
permissible border search or its functional equivalent as therefore could not
be conducted without a warrant, probable cause, or consent.140 This case turns
on the fact that the driver had provided proof of legal immigration status.141
Justice Powell proposed in his concurrence that Fourth Amendment rights
could be better protected by requirement of a warrant for the geographic area
where roving patrols would be conducted, and as a result, the standard would
require probable cause which cannot be based on race.142 These warrants
would provide CBP with the ability to stop vehicles within the specific
geographic area outlined in the warrant without individual warrants for every
vehicle CBP intends to stop and search through a roving patrol.143 Thus, they
would allow CBP to maintain some flexibility while eliminating discretion to
use race as a factor in deciding whom to stop.
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CONCLUSION
In the beginning of this comment, I asked whether United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce should be overruled. Throughout, I argued that the United
States Supreme Court legitimized race-based immigration enforcement in
Brignoni-Ponce. By legitimizing race-based immigration enforcement the
Supreme Court drastically impacted race-based discrimination in two ways.
First, the Supreme Court weakened the Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable searches for those who are perceived by immigration
officials to be of “Mexican appearance” by holding that “Mexican
appearance” could be a factor, though not the sole factor, to consider when
determining whether it is appropriate to stop and search a vehicle within the
100-mile United States border. Second, Brignoni-Ponce, armed immigration
enforcement and the courts with a rationale and legal basis to continue
perpetuating disparate and unconstitutional treatment of immigrant
communities.
However, Brignoni-Ponce is not the sole force lowering the standard of
search and seizure and thereby legitimizing a race-based immigration
enforcement system. In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court lowered the
protections provided by the Fourth Amendment through the establishment of
the reasonable suspicion standard. The reasonable suspicion standard requires
less than probable cause, thereby prioritizing law enforcement’s ability to
search and seize over an individual’s constitutional right to be free from
surveillance and policing. Coupled with Brignoni-Ponce, which subsequently
allowed race and ethnicity to be a factor in determining whether reasonable
suspicion was established in the context of a roving patrol conducted by CBP,
a legal basis for race-based immigration enforcement was created.
The elimination of the legal basis for race-based immigration
enforcement will requires the unlikely overruling of Brignoni-Ponce. As such,
to limit the disparate treatment and discrimination those of “Mexican
appearance” face, Fourth Amendment protections should be strengthened by
requiring a warrant to stop and search vehicles during roving patrols. Warrants
and the probable cause required to issue a warrant cannot be facially based on
race or ethnicity. While raced-based policing will not be eliminated through
increased Fourth Amendment protections for those subject to roving patrols,
or through the overruling of Brignoni-Ponce altogether, even a dilution of the
Supreme Court’s ruling is a worthwhile move against discrimination on the
basis of race, ethnicity, or the mythical concept of “Latinidad.”

